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Abstract 
This Article addresses copyright as a viable form of intellectual property 
protection for living, organic creations of science and art. The United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Association for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc.1 narrowed patent-eligible protection over living 
components of humans or other organisms. Synthetic biologists are 
expected to look with renewed focus on copyright law for the intellectual 
property protection of biological creations. The contribution of this Article 
is to reveal that the same issues are raised with regard to the 
copyrightability of the works of synthetic biology as are raised by pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural arts that use and produce living media as their 
works. The current contours of copyrightability present four identical 
questions that are particularly relevant to and difficult to answer in the 
context of science and art that purports to create works of living media:  
 
! Is living media copyrightable subject matter?  
! What is authorship (or who is an author) of living media?  
! What does it mean to create a fixed and tangible work of living 
media?  
! What constitutes an original creation of living media under the 
originality doctrines of merger and scenes a faire? 
                                                                                                                 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso Law School. JD, Columbia Law School 
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 1. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) 
(holding isolated DNA sequences not patentable).  
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This Article will provide an analytical framework for rethinking the 
contours of copyright so as to answer these questions by comparing 
contemporary scientific methods of creation with artistic methods in order 
to determine the copyright narratives and metaphors of subject matter, 
authorship, creation, and originality that best address the concerns 
underlying these four questions and allow copyright protection over the 
works. 
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I. Introduction: Copyright and Living Creations 
“In other studies you go as far as others have gone before you, 
and there is nothing more to know; but in a scientific pursuit 
there is continual food for discovery and wonder.” 
― MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN 37 (Colburn & Bentley 
1831) 
 
"Life! Do you hear me? Give my creation ... life!" 
― Mel Brooks & Gene Wilder, Young Frankenstein (20th 
Century Fox 1974) 
 
Contemporary scientific and artistic methods of creation threaten the 
comfortable conceptions and contours of copyright law, particularly the 
basic conception of what is copyrightable subject matter, and what it means 
to be an author of an original creation fixed in a tangible media. In synthetic 
biology, biological engineering, and DNA sequencing, contemporary 
scientists are using new technologies and methods of creation, and attempt 
to obtain intellectual property rights in new products and creations that 
were not producible or even conceivable a decade or, in some cases, even a 
year or two ago. At the same time, contemporary artists and designers are 
producing living, breathing, growing media as their pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works. Judges and practitioners must struggle with issues of what 
is copyrightable subject matter, what does authorship and fixation mean, 
and what should be the standard of originality in these new works of 
biology, genetics, and living art. 
DNA Strands http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:DNA_strands.gif 
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Patent law has had a head start on this intellectual property challenge. In 
Chakrabarty,2 the Supreme Court endorsed the patent claims of a biological 
engineer who asserted a claim over an artificially created organism—a 
human-engineered bacterium that is useful and innovative in the clean-up of 
petroleum (crude oil) spills—and accepted the patent eligibility of a human-
designed and human-engineered living organism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two years after Chakrabarty, the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) granted the first human DNA-related patents.3 Over the 
next thirty years, the USPTO and the courts enforced the rule of patent-
eligibility for isolated DNA molecules, recognizing that the human isolation 
of a molecule so as to produce novel and useful applications represents a 
patentable advancement over what existed in nature.4 The USPTO has 
granted over 40,000 patents drawn to human genetic material, almost 3,000 
of which are specifically directed to isolated DNA molecules.5  
                                                                                                                 
 2. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 3. See Eric J. Rogers, Can You Patent Genes? Yes and No, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC'Y 19, 19 & n.3 (2010); Brief for Respondents, Myriad Genetics, No. 12-398, 2013 
WL 860315 at *2-3 (Mar. 7, 2013). 
 4. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Brief 
for Respondents, Myriad Genetics, 2013 WL 860315 at *2. 
 5. See Rogers, supra note 5, at 19, 40; Brief for Respondents, Myriad Genetics, 2013 
WL 860315 at *2. In the mid-1990s, when DNA-related claims had been issuing for over a 
decade and upheld by the Federal Circuit, the USPTO evaluated its approach so as to ensure 
its compliance with § 101, and “to ensure that examination was of sufficiently high quality.”  
The USPTO concluded that “any ‘non-naturally occurring manufacture or composition of 
Chakrabarty Patent 3,813,316, Fig. 1 (May 28, 1974)- http://www.google.com/patents/US3813316? printsec=drawing#v=onepage&q&f=false 
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But events have overtaken patent law’s position with respect to the 
intellectual property protection of living creations. Myriad Genetics held that 
components of living organisms, such as isolated DNA strands  taken from 
human genes, are not patent eligible.6 The Supreme Court has narrowed the 
portal to intellectual property patent protection over the products of 
synthetic biology. Synthetic biology faces a critical juncture in its effort to 
find intellectual property protection for its creations, and biologists’ 
attention will likely turn to copyright law for the intellectual property 
protection of biological creations.  
                                                                                                                 
matter’ ” is patent-eligible under § 101. USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. 
Reg. 36,263 (July 14, 1995). The distinction was reinforced in 2001 to provide that “[a] 
patent on a gene covers the isolated and purified gene but does not cover the gene as it 
occurs in nature.” USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001); 
see also Brief for Respondents, Myriad Genetics, 2013 WL 860315 at *2-3. 
 6. The Court held that isolated DNA strands or isolated components of organisms are 
not patent eligible. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2118-19. The Court’s rationale turned on 
the finding that Myriad’s claims pertained to DNA sequences that were held to be “naturally 
occurring,” “products of nature.” Id. (comparing natural DNA sequence claims to artificially 
created, non-naturally-occurring cDNA sequence claims). 
Chromosome 17-Location of BRCA1 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/com
mons/archive/b/b9/20121109153222%21B
RCA1_de.png 
 
Myriad Genetics Patent 5,747,282, Fig. 4 
http://intellectualip.files.wordpress.com/2012/12/f
ig4.png 
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Copyright is a potential alternative for intellectual property protection of 
living creations.7 But copyright protection may be hindered by precedents 
that have limited the copyrightability of living works.8 Professors Andrew 
Torrance and Christopher Holman9 have been advancing the conversation 
regarding copyright, synthetic biology, and DNA sequencing.10 Professor 
Roberta Kwall11 and several other scholars have confronted the copyright 
issues of living media as the subject matter of artistic works.12 While each 
of these scholars has admirably wrestled with some of the questions of 
copyrightability, originality, and authorship that I will raise in this work, 
their scholarship fails to note the overlap of four identical questions that are 
particularly relevant to and difficult to answer in the context of science and 
conceptual art that uses and produces living media as its works:  
 
                                                                                                                 
 7. As of this writing in August 2013, there is no evidence that a copyright claim over a 
synthetical biological creation ever has been litigated. 
 8. See infra text accompanying notes 59-65. 
 9. Torrance is Professor of Law, Docking Faculty Scholar, University of Kansas 
School of Law. Holman is Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of 
Law. 
 10. See, e.g., Andrew W. Torrance, DNA Copyright, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (2011) 
[hereinafter Torrance, DNA] (copyrighting DNA sequences); Andrew W. Torrance, 
Synthesizing Law for Synthetic Biology, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 629 (2010) [hereinafter 
Torrance, Synthesizing] (discussing intellectual property protections, including copyright, for 
synthetic biological works); Christopher M. Holman, Copyright for Engineered DNA: An 
Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 699 (2011). It is fair to say the 
conversation started with a work by Cornell law professor Irving Kayton.  See Irving 
Kayton, Copyright in Living Generically Engineered Works, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191 
(1982)’ see also Tani Chen, Can a Biological Sequence Be Copyrighted?, 19 INTELL. PROP. 
& TECH. L.J. 1 (2007); Joseph N. Michelotti, Genes as Intellectual Property, 11 MICH. ST. U. 
J. MED. & L. 71 (2007). 
 11. Raymond P. Niro Professor of Intellectual Property Law, Co-Director, DePaul 
University College of Law Center for Jewish Law & Judaic Studies; Founding Director, 
DePaul College of Law Center for Intellectual Property Law and Information Technology. 
 12. See Roberta R. Kwall, The Lessons of Living Gardens and Jewish Process Theology 
for Authorship and Moral Rights, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 889 (2012); see also Charles 
Cronin, Dead on the Vine: Living and Conceptual Art and VARA, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. 
L. 209, 227 (2010); John Nivala, The Landscape Art of Daniel Urban Kiley, 29 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 267 (2005); Morgan M. Stoddard, Comment, Mother Nature 
as Muse: Copyright Protection for Works of Art and Photographs Inspired by, Based on, or 
Depicting Nature, 86 N.C. L. REV. 572 (2008). Professor Kwall also has written on narrative 
theory and its potential impact on the questions of authorship and creation, which parallels 
the angle I have taken on the topics of this Article. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Author-
Stories:” Narrative's Implications for Moral Rights and Copyright's Joint Authorship 
Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 25-27 (2001). 
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! Is living media copyrightable subject matter?  
! What is authorship (or who is an author) of living media?  
! What does it mean to create a fixed and tangible work of 
living media?  
! What constitutes an original creation of living media under 
the originality doctrines of merger and scenes a faire?  
 
In one sense, questions such as these are not entirely new and 
contemporary; copyright law always has had to deal with new technologies 
that have challenged conventional thinking on authorship, creation, and 
originality, in areas such as photography,13 chromolithography,14 motion 
pictures,15 and computer programs.16 Eventually, each art and science 
communicated a narrative containing one or more metaphors of the process 
or the product of creation that allowed the expansion of the contours of 
copyright to encompass the new technology and art form. Photography 
came to be understood not as a science or craft that literally captured 
reality, but one that depicted an author’s conception and composition of 
reality expressed in photographic media. Cameras came to be understood as 
tools that do not operate on their own to take pictures, but require an author 
to frame, compose, and create the image, fulfilling the copyright 
requirements of mental conception and artistic creation.17 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). Although 
photographs were mentioned as a form expressive work in the 1870 Revisions to the 
Copyright Act, Act of Congress of July 8, 1870, Rev. St. § 4952, Sarony is the first Supreme 
Court case to recognize that photographs are proper subjects of copyright protection. 
 14. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903). 
 15. Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 240, 242-43 (3rd Cir. 1903); Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 
222 U.S. 55, 61 (1911). 
 16. An early copyright question regarding a “program” arose in White-Smith Music Pub. 
Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908), which held that player-piano rolls were not “copies” of 
musical compositions and thus could not infringe the compositions. Id. at 16-18. Later, in the 
early 1960s, actual computer programs were accepted as “books” or “literature,” even in a 
non-human-readable form, such as magnetic tape, as long as a human-readable format 
(source code, as opposed to object code) also was deposited with the Register of Copyrights. 
See Copyright Office Circular No. 61, 1964 version. Later cases, including Lotus 
Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd, 516 
U.S. 233 (1996); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994); 
Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Industries, Ltd., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993); 
Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 701-14 (2d Cir. 1992), 
filled in important details in the conception of originality and copyrightability of computer 
programs. 
 17. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251-52. 
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Chromolithography came to be understood as a new, efficient, speedy, and 
cost-effective method of production of two-dimensional color images—the 
same images as might appear in paintings or drawings—that require an 
author to design and create the images, again fulfilling the copyright 
requirements of mental conception and artistic creation.18 Motion pictures 
drew on the accepted “technology” and artistry of pantomimes and 
photographs,19 and computer programs were analogized to literature with 
an expressive, communicative purpose,20 before being codified as a 
separate area of copyrightable subject matter.21 
Copyright is flexible enough to handle contemporary technologies that 
produce living organisms or organic components, but contemporary judges, 
practitioners, and scholars must reframe and, in some instances, reimagine 
the proper contours of copyrightability in order to bring living works under 
copyright protection.22 This Article does not propose a change in the 
copyright code or in the substance of the current interpretative rules and 
doctrines promulgated under the code to answer these questions. Copyright 
law does not suffer from a lack of meaningful rules on copyrightability, 
authorship, creation, and originality. Instead, this Article will provide a 
framework for rethinking the contours of copyright by comparing scientific 
methods of creation with artistic methods in order to determine the 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Sarony, 111 U.S. at 59-60; Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 
452-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 19. Edison, 122 F. at 242-43; Kalem, 222 U.S. at 61. The Townsend Amendment to the 
1909 Copyright Act created a class of copyrightable subject matter for dramatic motion 
pictures and a class for newsreels and similar non-dramatized material. Act of Aug. 24, 
1912, Pub. L. No. 62-303, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., 37 Stat. 488. Prior to the amendment, motion 
picture producers submitted printouts of the cells of their films on long strips of paper as 
their deposit of the “photographic prints” of their creation. See Motion Pictures in the 
Library of Congress, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS – RES. & REFERENCE SERVS., 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/mopic/mpcoll.html (Nov. 30, 2012). 
 20. See generally Sapna Kumar & Arti Rai, Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property 
Puzzle, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1745, 1749-50 (2007). 
 21. 17 U.S.C. § 101.  House Report 94 on the 1976 Act specifically discussed computer 
programs as being copyrightable subject matter under the Act. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 54 
(1976).  Later, the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980 rewrote 17 U.S.C. § 117 to 
clarify the types of rights and possible infringements of software protected under the 
Copyright Act. 
 22. In her 2012 Harvard Law Review article, Professor Rebecca Tushnet examined the 
problem of uninformed and disingenuous judicial determinations regarding visual images in 
copyright law. Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 683 (2012). This Article extends this conversation and analysis to the specific 
questions of subject matter, authorship, creation, and originality.  
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narratives and metaphors of subject matter, authorship, fixation, and 
originality that best address the concerns underlying the four questions 
posed above of authorship, fixation, originality, and copyrightability. The 
framework grounds the answer to each question with the proper narrative 
and metaphor that will allow the works to navigate the restrictions and 
limitations of the copyrightability requirement and the originality doctrines 
of merger, scenes a faire, functionality, and the idea-expression distinction. 
The Article also will discuss the metaphors and narratives that are prone to 
failure and that might deny copyright protection to living works of 
contemporary art and science. Describing the proper conception of the 
nature and scope of a copyright over artistic creations will aid judges and 
practitioners in reaching an appropriate conception of the nature and scope 
of contemporary scientific creations, allowing a proper, desirable scope of 
protection for each scientific and artistic work.23 
II. Living Media as Copyrightable Subject Matter in Art and Synthetic 
Biology 
Copyrightability is a complicated topic when applied to the creations of 
living media. This Article separates the requirement of copyrightable 
subject matter from the related concepts of originality, authorship, and 
fixation. This section focuses on the narrative and metaphors that will allow 
the subject matter of synthetic biology and other arts and sciences 
producing works of living media to receive copyright protection. 
Copyrightable subject matter is limited. The limitations on protectable 
subject matter come from: 
 
! the nature of copyright, which will be compared to patent law, 
! copyright law’s requirements of expressive subject matter, 
and 
! copyright’s idea-expression distinction.  
 
The proper narrative of subject matter is required to navigate the 
limitations imposed by the law. 
                                                                                                                 
 23. A note on methodology: I have included multiple diagrams and illustrations 
throughout this article as an intentional reminder and demonstration that the creations of 
synthetic biology can be demonstrated and established through visual and other media. 
These works have protectable expressive characteristics as graphical-pictorial-sculptural 
works in the same way that computer programs have been accepted to have protectable 
literary characteristics in both the source code and object code. 
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The Copyright Code, section 102, states: 
 (a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, 
in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can 
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either 
directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of 
authorship include the following categories: (1) literary works; 
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) 
dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) 
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual 
works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.  
 (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work 
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, 
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless 
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or 
embodied in such work.24 
Section 102 is the statutory source for copyright’s requirements of 
expressive subject matter, the idea-expression distinction, and the doctrines 
of functionality, merger, and scenes a faire.25 At first blush, copyright 
cannot protect a procedure, process, system, method of operation. 
Copyright does not protect inventions when characterized as concepts, 
principles, or discoveries.26 Copyright cannot protect formulas and recipes, 
including chemical formulas, that list components and ingredients and 
layout the process to perform the task.27  
The approved categories of section 102 are expressive works in the form 
of literary works; musical works; dramatic works; pantomimes and 
choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; motion 
pictures and other audiovisual works; sound recordings; and architectural 
works. There is room for debate whether the listed categories limit the 
subject matter of copyright to any particular class or nature of works. 
Congress itself declared the list to be illustrative and not limiting.28 But an 
                                                                                                                 
 24. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 25. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 836 (10th Cir. 1993); 
Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703-06 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 26. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
 27. Id; see also Gates Rubber, 9 F.3d at 836; Publ’ns Int'l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 
F.3d 473, 481-82 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 28. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666. 
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inclusive, illustrative listing in statutory interpretation invites the 
application of the ejusdem generis maxim: that the listed words suggest that 
items of the same general kind and nature (i.e., the same genus) as the listed 
words are acceptable and others are not, and this is to be the guidance for 
the evaluation of appropriate subject matter.29 Thus, the narrative of subject 
matter must tell a story of an expressive product of creation.30 
Copyright’s and patent law’s subjects are not mutually exclusive, but 
they protect their subjects of creation differently and reward different 
products of intellectual creation, satisfying different expectations of 
protectability. In contrast to copyright, patent law protection has nothing to 
do with expression and everything to do with ideas. In general, a patent can 
protect ideas, processes, and procedures that are useful, novel, not 
anticipated, and invented by the author. A copyright cannot protect ideas, 
processes, or procedures of any nature or form, regardless of how 
unprecedented, inventive, useful, or novel they may be. 
The Patent Code, section 101,31 “Inventions patentable,” states: 
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. 
To drive home the point, the Patent Code, section 100,32 “Definitions,” 
states: 
 When used in this title unless the context otherwise 
indicates –  
 (a) The term “invention” means invention or discovery. 
 (b) The term “process” means process, art or method, and 
includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, 
composition of matter, or material. 
                                                                                                                 
 29. See, e.g., Todamerica Musica v. Radio Corp. of Am., 171 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1949) 
(applying ejusdem generis maxim to sections 2 and 4 of the 1909 Copyright Act defining the 
specific subjects of copyright). 
 30. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991) (copyright 
law limited to original expressive works, and “limits severely the scope of protection in fact-
based works”); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985) 
(“The copyright is limited to those aspects of the work—termed ‘expression’—that display 
the stamp of the author's originality.”). 
 31. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 32. 35 U.S.C. § 100. 
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Thus, patent law welcomes and protects all processes, discoveries, 
machines, items of manufacture, or compositions of matter.33 
Under 17 U.S.C. § 102’s limitations, copyright cannot protect the actual 
synthetic biological discovery of a gene-splicing procedure or prevent 
others from using the procedure itself.34 It should follow that copyright 
cannot protect an actual, existing sequence of DNA that a biologist has 
isolated and discovered that it has significant function in the creation of a 
certain protein that can be exploited to create a biological component if the 
biologist’s narrative is evaluated as a process or procedure or discovery.35 
Copyright may cover the creation of a purified form of a DNA sequence 
that does not exist in nature; the Supreme Court has made that distinction 
for patent law and granted patent protection over forms of isolated, purified 
DNA sequences—cDNA—that are not naturally occurring products of 
nature.36 Copyright also might protect living media if it can be found to fall 
within one of the protected categories—literature; pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural works;37 computer programs,38 or compilations.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 33. Id. §§ 100, 101. 
 34. An analogous example would be to a recipe, which is unprotectable in copyright as 
a formula, process, or procedure when examined as a list of ingredients and instructions for 
the preparation of a dish, while recipes might be copyrightable in compilation with 
protectable literary expression or creative, artistic layout and presentation. Compare Publ’ns 
Intl., Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 474, 480-81 (7th Cir. 1996) (recipes without 
literary adornment are not copyrightable), and Lambing v. Godiva Chocolatier, 142 F.3d 434 
(Table), 1998 WL 58050 (6th Cir. 1998) (same), and Continental Micro, Inc. v. HPC, Inc., 
No. 95 C 3829, 1997 WL 309028 at **1-2 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 4, 1997) (same), and Harrell v. St. 
John, 792 F. Supp. 2d 933, 943 (S.D. Miss. 2011), and  37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (lists of 
ingredients not copyrightable), with Barbour v. Head, 178 F. Supp. 2d 758, 761-64 (S.D. 
Tex. 2001) (cowboy-themed cookbook combined creative, expressive elements with recipes 
in copyrightable compilation).  
 35. See sources cited supra note 34. Myriad Genetics denied patent-eligibility to 
isolated sequences of DNA that are naturally occurring. 133 S. Ct. at 2117-19. 
 36. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2119. 
 37. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 38. Computer programs are recognized as a specific category of copyrightable subject 
matter under 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117. The legislative history of the 1976 Act also recognized 
programs as copyrightable under the category of “literature.” See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 
54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667 (“‘literary works' . . . includes . . . 
computer programs”); id. at 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5664 (“computer 
programs . . . were . . . copyrightable from the outset”); id. at 116, reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N.at 5731 (1976 Act recognizes “copyright-ability of computer programs”). 
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With a little narrative reasoning,39 that just might be possible. 
A.  The Narrative of Synthetic Biological Subject Matter 
The story of synthetic biology involves some very exciting subject 
matter. Practitioners and proponents alike describe the creation of new 
DNA sequences leading to new genes, and to the production of 
polypeptides and proteins leading to new organic components, life forms, or 
entirely new organisms. There is nothing lacking in the potential subjects of 
study and creation; only the collective imagination of synthetic biologists 
seems able to limit the potential. Detractors warn of the downside—super 
germs and viruses, cloning, designer babies—and raise many other 
potentially troublesome legal and ethical questions involving the 
manipulation of life forms. Nevertheless, the question raised and answered 
here is: “Are the products of synthetic biology copyrightable?” 
The copyrightable subject matter issue in synthetic biology is affected by 
questions of content, as well as by the limits on protection of ideas, 
discoveries, and inventions. Even with the question of content, there are 
two parts to the issue—first, what is nature of the creation that a synthetic 
biologist would seek to protect, and second, can you protect actual living 
creations under copyright law. 
1. The Nature of the Synthetic Biological Creation as Subject Matter 
Regarding the nature of the creation that a synthetic biologist would seek 
to protect, the subject matter issue would seem to present a low prospect of 
success for the biologist author because compared to patent law, which 
welcomes and protects all processes, discoveries, machines, items of 
manufacture, or compositions of matter,40 copyright protects only 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Narrative reasoning, or storytelling, is a form of rhetoric and advocacy, and not 
simply a campfire pastime. See, e.g., ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, 
MINDING THE LAW 113-14 (2000); MICHAEL D. MURRAY & CHRISTY H. DESANCTIS, 
ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING AND ORAL ADVOCACY ch. 3 (2013); Daniel A. Farber & 
Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 807 (1993); Brian J. Foley & Ruth Anne Robbins, Fiction 101: A Primer for Lawyers 
on How to Use Fiction Writing Techniques to Write Persuasive Facts Sections, 32 RUTGERS 
L.J. 459 (2001); Michael D. Murray, Explanatory Synthesis and Rule Synthesis: A 
Comparative Civil Law and Common Law Analysis, 83-84 BAHÇEŞEHIR ÜNIVERSITESI 
HUKUK FAKÜLTESI-KAZANCI HUKUK DERGISI 139 (2011);  Michael D. Murray, Rule 
Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, 8 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: J. ALWD  217 (2011);  
DAVID RAY PAPKE, NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL DISCOURSE: A READER IN STORYTELLING 
AND THE LAW (1991).  
 40. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100, 101. 
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expressive works in the form of literary works; musical works; dramatic 
works; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; sound 
recordings; architectural works; computer programs; and compilations of 
protectable or unprotectable content.  
Of the several authors writing about copyrightability of natural and 
artificially produced gene sequences and synthetic biological components 
and organisms, the majority have concluded that the DNA sequences, 
components, and organisms are copyrightable.41 These authors have 
suggested various metaphors to support the assertion that DNA sequences, 
biological components, and newly-generated organisms are works—of 
authorship—created by the synthetic biologist: that the work are writings 
written by the biologist,42 that they are compilations,43 or that they are 
programs designed to carry out a biological function.44 As discussed below, 
not all of these metaphors can produce satisfactory copyright protection 
over biological works.  
The conception of the biologist is greater than most of these analogies. A 
deconstruction of the narrative of creation in synthetic biology includes: 
 
! The discovery itself: The creation of knowledge through 
study, research, and experimentation to discover the attributes 
of DNA sequences and the proteins that might be produced 
through manipulation of the coding of the sequences, which in 
greater and greater combinations might produce organic 
components or actual organisms; 
! The invention of the method and process of production: 
The creation of a method or process of production of 
meaningful DNA sequences that are coded and engineered for 
the production of proteins, organic components, and 
organisms; 
                                                                                                                 
 41. See sources cited supra note 10. 
 42. E.g., Torrance, DNA, supra note 10, at 4-6; Torrance, Synthesizing, supra note 10, at 
632-35; Holman, supra note 10, at 702-04; Kayton, supra note 10, at 194-96. 
 43. E.g., Kayton, supra note 10, at 201-03. But see Michelotti, supra note 10, at 86-87 
(expressing pessimism about compilation copyrights); Kumar & Rai, supra note 20, at 1748, 
1760-62 (discussing large-scale gene syntheses), 1764 (doubts concerning copyrightability 
of compilations). 
 44. E.g., Torrance, DNA, supra note 10, at 23-24, 30-34; Holman, supra note 10, at 709-
16; Kayton, supra note 10, at 198. 
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! The writing, rendering, or recording of the steps of 
production: The creation of a recorded (written, taped, 
coded) description of the steps of the production of 
meaningful DNA sequences that are coded and engineered for 
the production of proteins, organic components, and 
organisms, and a record, description, or depiction of the 
sequences, proteins, components, or organisms themselves; 
! The creation itself: The actual sequences, proteins, 
components, and organisms themselves—in their physical, 
material form—that are created by the biologist. 
 
Ideally, biologist authors would receive protection for each of these four 
items as the fruits of their intellectual conceptions, rendering, and creations. 
In reality, only varying levels of protection may be afforded to each under 
copyright law, affording a limited number of rights, and satisfying different 
expectations short of the grant of a thick copyright over each instance of 
conception and creation. The narrative of the subject matter of the works 
might be altered to reflect what may actually be protected under copyright 
law: 
 
! Writing, rendering, or recording of the discovery itself: 
The literary, visual, or audio-visual writing or recording of the 
actual knowledge created through study, research, and 
experimentation to discover the attributes of DNA sequences, 
the proteins they might code, and in greater and greater 
combinations, the dynamic, replicative, perennial components 
of actual organisms45 that the biologist might produce through 
manipulation of the sequences and proteins. The writings and 
recordings may be protected from unauthorized copying and, 
with some limitations, also protected from unauthorized 
translation, adaptation, and conversion into other writings, 
renderings, or recordings as derivative works of the initial 
write-up; 
  
                                                                                                                 
 45. My thanks are given to Osman Mirza, my consultant on synthetic biology, for 
supplying the proper descriptors here. 
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! Writing, rendering, or recording of the processes and 
procedures of production: The creation of a recorded 
(written, taped, coded) description of the steps of the 
production of meaningful sequences, proteins, organic 
components, and organisms, which are protected from 
unauthorized copying and, to a limited extent, also protected 
from unauthorized translation, adaptation, and conversion into 
other writings, renderings, or recordings as derivative works 
of the initial recorded description; 
! Writing, rendering, or recording of the creations: The 
creation of a recorded (written, taped, coded) description, 
rendering, or depiction of the sequences, proteins, organic 
components, or organisms themselves. The goal of this record 
of the products of creation would be to prevent the copying or 
translation, adaptation, and conversion of the actual recorded 
description, rendering, or depiction of the creations into other  
  
Bacterium Cell  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Average_prokaryote_cell-_en.svg 
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! writings, renderings, or depictions. At best, this step would 
also prevent the creation of actual, living, 3-
dimensionalderivative works from these 2-dimensional or 
audio visual records and descriptions. Ultimate success would 
be the right to control the recreation and further use of the 
sequences, proteins, organic components, or organisms 
themselves as derivative works of the original recorded 
description, rendering, or depiction of the sequences, proteins, 
organic components, or living organisms;  
! Protection of the creations themselves: This final step 
would seek copyright protection over the biological creations 
themselves in the form of the physical products—the 
artificially created sequences, proteins, organic components, 
or organisms. The actual creations would be protected from 
physical copying, i.e., by culturing or cell-division, and 
ultimately this step would afford the biologist the right to 
control the recreation and further use of the artificially 
produced sequences, proteins, components, or organisms 
themselves as derivative works of the original sequences, 
proteins, organic components, or living organisms created by 
the biologist. 
 
The reconstituted narrative of creation attempts to achieve copyright 
protection over the living biological creations themselves and over three 
types of recordings and descriptions of the creations. The goal is to achieve 
copy-protection for the original creations and for derivative works, 
including derivative works produced from the record, depiction, and 
description of the creations. 46  
                                                                                                                 
 46. The copyright derivative works right extends to the creation of physical works from 
written plans and designs, such as the creation of 3-dimensional objects based on a 
copyrighted 2-dimensional plan. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 8.01[B] (2008) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT]; see also Meshwerks, Inc. 
v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1267 (10th Cir. 2008); Entm't Research 
Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1221-24 (9th Cir. 1997); 
Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1980); JCW Invs., Inc. v. 
Novelty, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1033-36 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
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The reconstituted narrative places most of the creations of synthetic 
biology into categories of expressive media—literature, audio and visual 
recordings, or graphical and pictorial works. What is lost is the protection of 
the conceptions of discovery and invention. What is preserved is the 
protection of the author’s  record of the conceptions of discovery and 
invention, at least in the literal terms and contents of the record and a limited 
number of abstractions from these literal terms and contents in the form of 
derivative works. The copying and derivative works protections ought to 
slow down competitors who would prefer a quick path to duplicate, recreate,  
Excerpt – One Method of Preparation of Complementary DNA 
(cDNA) for Cloning, http://www.mun.ca/biology/desmid/brian/ 
BIOL4900/CB18_31.html (Pearson: Addison Wesley Longman 
1999) 
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and profit from the actual discoveries and inventions rather than taking the 
time and expending the effort to study the art and science of creation from 
written and recorded media, learning from it, and applying the ideas, 
processes, and procedures step by step, one experiment at a time, so as to 
produce the same or similar products on their own.  
a) Using Literary, Graphical, Pictorial, Audio, or Audio-Visual Works to 
Protect the Biological Creation 
The use of expressive media to depict and record the discovery and 
invention of a work of synthetic biology might sound mundane, but this 
affords the author with the surest protection over the record and description 
of the creation. The power of the record and depiction is in the derivative 
works right owned by the creator of the expressive work. The prohibition  
Formation of a cDNA Library,  http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/ 
e/e6/Formation_of_a_cDNA_Library.jpg 
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not to copy the original expression will extend to the creation of derivative 
works created from the writings, depictions, or recordings the biologist has 
created.47 The record and depiction will prevent not only copying of the 
expressive works but also derivative works of a real life, 3-Dimensional 
nature.  
There is value in multiplying the expressions—the records of discovery 
or invention—in order to multiply the scope of potential derivative works 
that be controlled by the copyright owner. It would be worthwhile to write 
up, draw up, and make a film or animation of the actual sequence or 
component you have generated.48 Random, independent creation is 
                                                                                                                 
 47. See Winfield Collection, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus., Corp., 147 Fed. Appx. 547, 551-52 
(6th Cir. 2005). See also King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924); 
Geisel v. Poynter Prods. Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. 
Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). 
 48. Two authors, Stephen Wilson and Willem Stemmer, have discussed encoding the 
record of the discovery or invention of DNA sequences into an encrypted MP3 audio file to 
take advantage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Stephen R. Wilson, Copyright 
Protection For DNA Sequences: Can the Biotech Industry Harmonize Science with Song?, 
44 JURIMETRICS J. 409 (2004); Willem P.C. Stemmer, How to Publish DNA Sequences with 
Copyright Protection, 20 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 217, 217 (2002). Presumably, the record 
Polymerase Chain Reaction, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polymerase_chain_reaction#mediaviewer/ 
File:Polymerase_chain_reaction.svg (Enzoklop Apr. 5, 2014) 
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permitted under copyright as only “copying” is precluded, but the 
replication of the exact creation described and depicted in the copyrighted 
work is not permitted. Multiplying the expressions of the creation will make 
it more difficult to explain away every expression, diagram, or description 
produced by the original biologist when a competitor asserts a claim of 
independent creation.  
There is a limitation on the rights sought here in the form of the idea-
expression distinction and its doctrines of merger, scenes a faire, and 
functionality. It is true that the ideas behind the creation are open to be used 
by all competitors, and any actual processes and procedures described may 
                                                                                                                 
would be protected by decryption software that would limit the access to an audience that 
was licensed to listen to the discovery. However, after listening to the recording and making 
notes, the audience of the work can proceed as if they received a written or unencrypted 
report—i.e., the ideas and facts of the discovery would still be available to the audience 
under 17 U.S.C. § 102. The only violation would come if the recipient broke the decryption 
in order to copy the record. Following up on the ideas, processes, or procedures does not 
require duplication of the original media.  
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be tried and exploited by others. Ideas, processes, and procedures may be 
protected by trade secret or patent law, but not copyright. (These limitations 
will be discussed in Section V infra). 
A writing and recording of the attributes of a preexisting sequence of 
DNA identified by the biologist would have the lowest potential to deter a 
competitive use of the information in the writing. Preexisting sequences 
identified and described by the biologist can be “refound” and used by 
others. Nevertheless, the protections on copying and creating derivative 
works may slow down the retransmission of information regarding the 
creation. 
b) Using the Metaphor of a Compilation to Protect the Actual Biological 
Creation 
The protection of actual biological works may be attempted under the 
category of compilation. This is described as a metaphor of compilation 
because the true biological task is not the combination of separate 
expressive parts to make a collective whole with greater expressive 
potential, as in the case of a collage,49 or doll’s face,50 or computer graphics 
interface.51 Instead, the biologist seeks to create a unitary whole creation, 
whether it be a DNA sequence, a protein, a biological component, or a 
complete organism.  
The copyright code anticipates that creative, original combinations of 
copyrightable or non-copyrightable elements may be protected. Section 101 
of the Code reads in part: “A ‘compilation’ is a work formed by the 
collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are 
selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a 
whole constitutes an original work of authorship. . . .”52 While this 
definition requires no analogy or abstraction—existing, recombined, or 
manipulated sequences, proteins, and components may be selected and 
arranged to produce an original work designed and created by the biologist 
author—the results may be less than desirable. Compilations are protected 
as compilations. To claim a copyright on the basis of a compilation might 
suggest that the component parts of the compilation are not themselves 
                                                                                                                 
 49. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 45, § 3.02; Jarvis v. K2 Inc., 486 F.3d 526, 531-
32 (9th Cir.2007); Harris v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 2d 622, 628-29 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
 50. E.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Goldberger Doll Mfg. Co., 365 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 51. Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1346 (5th Cir. 
1994); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1446-47 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 52. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
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protected or in fact are not copyrightable; otherwise, why seek protection 
for the creation only as a compilation. And the non-copyrighted or non-
copyrightable component parts of a compilation generally may be used 
freely by others—the only identified original creation of the author is the 
complete combination, and only that exact combination is protected.53 
Thus, it would seem to be true that a compilation of organic parts could be 
reverse-engineered and that a second, skilled biologist might recreate the 
effect of the work in a slightly altered but nonetheless original combination 
without violating the copyright of the first biologist.  
If the argument may be made that the desired biological effect may only 
be achieved by the single combination of organic components created by 
the original author, this argument would invite the application of the merger 
doctrine (discussed at greater length in Section V, infra) and would 
preclude copyright protection over the single means to achieve the result.  
Lastly, the component parts are themselves organic substances—
components of living creatures—meaning that a claim to a compilation 
copyright is claim to own a monopoly over a component of a living 
creature, even a human being. This argument (discussed at greater length in 
Section II(B), infra) might find a difficult reception with many judges and 
other legal audiences. Therefore, there are significant downsides and 
limitations to the compilation narrative.  
c) Using the Metaphor of a Computer Program to Protect the Actual 
Biological Creation 
The protection of actual creations—new sequences of DNA, biological 
components, and new organisms created through the manipulation of 
sequences, polypeptides, and proteins—is the most important and desirable 
protection to be obtained in copyright. The simplest narrative is that the 
biologist created a new, original—something—fixed in a tangible medium. If 
it were possible in copyright law to fill in the blank with DNA sequence, 
protein, organic component, or organism, our discussion would be finished 
here. But copyright requires a certain something—an expressive something. 
Section 102 of the code, quoted above, requires “original works of author- 
 
                                                                                                                 
 53. In Mattel v. Goldberger Dolls, Mattel was able to claim a copyright in the total 
combined concept and appearance of Barbie’s face, even though, in isolation, each feature of 
Barbie’s face—large, widely-spaced eyes, accentuated eyebrows and lashes, pert nose, and 
bow-shaped lips—were standard features in doll faces of all kinds, and thus individually 
unprotectable. Only the total compilation that said, “Barbie’s face,” to a viewer was 
protected.  
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Gene Splicing 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0a/DNA_alternative_splicing.gif 
 
ship fixed in any something—an expressive something. Section 102 of the 
code, quoted above, requires “original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression.” Further, the expressive works must be 
analogous to the categories of works listed as illustration. And finally, the 
protectable attributes of the work must be expressive, not functional.54 
Several authors have suggested that a creation of synthetic biology is 
analogous to a computer program, one of the categories provided for in 17 
U.S.C. § 102.55 Sequences of DNA, biological components, and new 
organisms are programmed by the biologist through the manipulation of 
sequences, polypeptides, and proteins to produce the effects and results 
conceived of by the biologist, just as an existing computer language is 
manipulated by the computer programmer to produce the effects and results 
conceived of by the programmer. 
Comparing the question of the copyrightability of DNA sequences and 
artificially-produced proteins, organic components, and organisms to the 
copyrightability of computer programs is the narrative with the greatest 
potential for success. The computer program analogy is especially apt 
because DNA sequences already are commonly analogized by synthetic 
biologists as programs that order the production of proteins and 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Various: 17 USC 101, 102(a), (b); Blake v. Selden, Mazer v. Stein, Esquire Lamp, 
etc. 
 55. See sources cited supra note 10. 
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subsequently of biological organisms.56 Thus, the practitioners of the art 
believe in this metaphor and can support it if push comes to shove in a 
copyright dispute. 
(1) Computer Programs—Two Levels of Metaphor 
Computer programs became protected under copyright law as a form of 
writing and literature by virtue of a two-part metaphor. The first layer of the 
metaphor is that a program written in source code or expressed in object 
code is in fact a writing, a medium of expression akin to literature. The 
second layer is that that the writing is written for the purpose of 
communicating something to an audience. There are in fact two audiences 
for the writing: the computer (reading the object code), and trained 
computer programmers (reading the source code). 
Computer programs are written in a language—a system of symbols that 
are assigned to represent the operation of combinations of on-off signals 
(1’s and 0’s, a binary radix) controlling the flow of electric current in a 
computer device (e.g., a chip or processor). There is no metaphor at the first 
level because a computer language is a “language,” an assigned system of 
symbols to represent some other thing or operation in the traditional 
methodology common to all languages. Thus the metaphor begins with 
writing: 
Writing:. The first layer of metaphor is that of a computer 
programmer who “writes” or “composes” a work of literature—a 
program—making use of the existing computer language. The 
program is what is offered for copyright. 
Communicative Work: The metaphor at the second level of 
“writing” fits the program under the category of “literature,” a 
writing with a communicative, expressive objective. This was 
not an enormous hurdle to leap because the program itself is 
expressive—it is written in symbols that can be recognized and 
interpreted by those familiar with the language and 
communicated to audiences who are not familiar with the 
language.  
Computer programs are not altogether different from traditional literature 
that operates at two levels of metaphor—a language, such as English, that 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Or as Crick, of the DNA pioneer duo, Watson and Crick, once pointed out: “DNA 
makes RNA, RNA makes protein, and proteins make us.” Torrance, DNA, supra note 10, at 
13 (quoting EVELYN FOX KELLER, THE CENTURY OF THE GENE 54 (2000)). 
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consists of letters and words that represent something else, and an author 
who writes or composes a work of authorship using the existing language to 
produce a result—the communication of thoughts and feelings to those who 
can read and understand the existing language, and who might further 
interpret and communicate it to others who do not know the existing 
language. What is different about computer language is the environment in 
which the language and the program operate—computers—and the 
“audience” for the program—again, computer processors—as opposed to 
traditional literature, which can operate in any environment where actual 
humans can read or listen to the creation of the author. Of course, computer 
programs gained a special boost when Congress amended the copyright 
code to make it plain that computer programs are copyrightable, removing 
the necessity to analogize computer programs to traditional literature.57 
(2) Biological Creations—Three Levels of Metaphor 
A biological creation is even more complicated that a computer program 
and has an additional layer of metaphor: first, DNA must be analogized to a 
language; second, sequencing or splicing and manipulating DNA, and 
further manipulating polypeptides to produce proteins and biological 
components, must be analogized to writing in a language; and third, the end 
product must be analogized to a work of expression that communicates 
something. To illustrate this further and more specifically, in synthetic 
biology, the layers of metaphoric analogy may be broken down as follows: 
Language – that DNA is a “language” of four symbols (A, T, G, 
C) representing actual chemical nucleotides, adenine, thymine, 
guanine, and cytosine that in combination are the basis of all 
DNA and, by extension, all polypeptides, proteins, biological 
components, and organisms; 
Writing – that a biologist who identifies a sequence of DNA, or 
acts to produce a new sequence of DNA or to produce something 
more complex building on new sequences of DNA, actually 
“writes” or “composes” a work (see the discussion of 
“communicative work” below) of expression and 
communication using a language in a manner that is analogous 
to the writing of a computer program or even the writing of 
actual, traditional literature; 
  
                                                                                                                 
 57. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117. 
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Communicative Work – that the resulting DNA sequence, 
protein, component, or organism, identified or composed by the 
biologist is an expressive, communicative “work of authorship,” 
a creation of the mind, analogous to a computer program or work 
of literature. 
 
DNA Structure  http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b8/DNA-structure-and-bases.png 
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There are difficulties in each analogy. First, it must be accepted that the 
chemical formula representing a compound known as one of the four 
nucleotides is represented symbolically not just by the compound name 
(e.g., adenine) but also by the first letter, “A,” of the compound. And 
second, that this assignment has expressive qualities meeting our 
understanding of the term, language. It is noteworthy that the audience for 
the “A-T-G-C” language is the biologists and other humans studying the 
actual processes of nature, which is different from the “audience” of the 
chemical compounds themselves, which are other compounds, 
polypeptides, and proteins at the level of organic chemistry. 
The metaphor of writing, or authorship, is troublesome because the 
biologist is dealing not simply with a language with which the biologist 
writes and composes to produce a communicative result, but instead, with 
actual organic chemical compounds, components, and organisms that are 
manipulated to produce additional sequences of compounds, components, 
and living things. Taken by itself, the writing metaphor might be analyzed 
as a double metaphor—that the language of the writing is a symbolic 
representation of biological subjects, and the biologist’s working with the 
biological subjects is in some ways analogous to writing up something that 
can be expressed in the language and understood by others trained in the 
language—and each half of the double metaphor relies on the audience’s 
understanding and acceptance of the other.  
The expressive, communicative nature of the results of the writing also 
works on two levels because the biologist programs the biological 
components to communicate the designed biological results on an organic 
level, and the work itself also can be read by other biologists who will 
understand its use of the biological language. 
The metaphor of a work or creation relies on the acceptance of the first 
two layers of metaphors. Then, the third layer follows directly, because the 
end product of the biologist’s working with the biological subjects is a new 
biological subject that can be expressed using the symbols and terms of the 
language, and can produce results—communicative, expressive results to 
biologists trained in the language that stand in for the actual real life 
biological results—new sequences, organic components, and organisms—
produced by the biologist. 
If successfully communicated and accepted, the complete formula means 
that the products of synthetic biology—the new sequences, components, 
and organisms produced by the biologist—are themselves protected under 
copyright. They may not be duplicated or replicated or adapted into new 
products of synthetic biology. The argument is difficult both to 
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communicate and to achieve the proper understanding and acceptance by 
the audience, but it has a tremendous upside in achieving exactly what the 
biologist author wishes to achieve. 
The strengths of the computer program analogy, however, also suggest 
its weaknesses. As with compilations, if the argument is made that the 
desired biological effect may only be achieved within the language of DNA 
sequences by the combination of organic components created by the 
original author, this argument would invite the application of the merger 
doctrine (discussed at greater length in Section V, infra), and would 
preclude copyright protection over the single means to achieve the result. 
And once more, the program designed and written by the biologist, 
however analogized or abstracted, still represents actual organic 
substances—components of living creatures—meaning that a claim to a 
program copyright is claim to own a monopoly over a component of a 
living creature, even a human being. As discussed in Section II(B), infra, 
this argument, might find a difficult reception with many judges and other 
legal audiences.  
Each of the levels of metaphor might fail—the biological work might not 
be regarded as a written work of language that is expressive—thus making 
the entire exercise potentially subject to failure when a claim or defense is 
attempted to be communicated to a court or to other legal practitioners. In 
other words, the fact that the audience of the argument must recognize and 
accept the analogies drawn from three levels of metaphors is a long row to 
hoe for the biologist and her lawyer. Nevertheless, this formula offers the 
best chance of protecting actual works of synthetic biology because the path 
has been cleared for the acceptance of each level of the metaphor by the 
precedent of computer programs. Biological creations are a logical 
extension of this metaphor, and by this extension, the entire creation of the 
biologist may be protected.  
d) Failure Narratives: Using Metaphors of a Recipe or Chemical 
Formula 
A good lawyer and advocate will hope for the best and prepare for the 
worst. As complicated as the above discussion in Section II(A)(1)(c) might 
sound, the computer program metaphor is the preferred metaphor for DNA 
sequencing and especially for artificially-produced DNA sequences, 
proteins, organic components, and organisms. If the counterargument gains 
traction that the proper analogy for works relating to synthetic biology is of 
a recipe or chemical formula, then copyright law most likely will not 
provide adequate protection for synthetic biologist authors. 
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A true recipe or chemical formula is a description of a process and the 
ingredients needed for the process to produce a certain result. As such, the 
recipe or formula is nearly entirely unprotectable under Section 102 of the 
copyright code and its associated doctrines of functionality and merger. The 
wording, layout, and formatting of a recipe or chemical formula may be 
protected under copyright, but not the formula itself, nor the ingredients 
described in the formula. A competitor might argue that the narrative of 
creation of synthetic biology is that the biologist made a discovery 
(unprotectable event in copyright law) of the DNA components (preexisting 
material, not created by the biologist) and their properties (preexisting 
material, not created by the biologist) as a recipe or chemical formula to 
follow to produce a functional result.  
Many if not all of the ingredients of a typical recipe or formula were not 
created by the author, and anyone can take preexisting ingredients and 
follow the same recipe or formula to produce the product. The same might 
be said of certain “ingredients” of a creation of synthetic biology. This 
observation alone is not so damning because it suggests a possible 
counterargument—that if the components were in fact created by the 
biologist author, then they may not be freely used by subsequent biologists. 
However, how any one component used in the larger recipe came to be 
created may itself face the characterization of a recipe or formula, and so 
on, all the way down, until only preexisting biochemical elements with 
functional properties were discovered to be useful when manipulated to 
produce a component that became an ingredient used in combination with 
other preexisting or created components (ingredients) for brewing up a 
certain biochemical result. It is unfortunate that the recipe or chemical 
formula narrative is so simple to state; its simplicity and elegance is one of 
its greatest strengths. 
The strongest counterargument to the assertion that synthetic biology is 
akin to a recipe or formula is the narrative of the work as a computer 
program. A computer program is not just a description of a process, it is 
itself a creation, written by the biologist as a whole work with an expressive 
function and purpose. True, a program, recipe, or formula each can be 
followed to produce a result, but that is where the comparison ends. Even 
an original creative compilation (Section II(A)(2) supra) is a complete 
whole, valuable in its expressive attributes because of the original and 
creative way it is compiled. A computer formula is well beyond that. It is a 
complete, composed work analogous to a work of literature. A recipe is to a 
novel what a simple chemical formula is to a creation of synthetic biology.  
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B. The Narrative of Living Artistic Works 
The above discussion leads to the second topic of this section on 
copyrightable subject matter: what is the proper narrative of living artistic 
works that preserves the greatest copyrightable content of the works. 
The success or failure of a narrative of synthetic biology will turn in part 
on the author’s ability to defuse or overcome copyright law’s reservations 
concerning living media. This is the first overlapping issue with artistic 
creations using living subject matter, namely: Can an artist or scientist 
copyright a living, growing, organic, living thing?  
Patent law has answered this question, “yes,” if the organism was created 
by the author.58 This should give hope to biological or artistic designers. 
After all, if United States patent law is amenable to a twenty-year complete 
monopoly on the creation, duplication, growing, or exploitation of a living 
organism, why shouldn’t copyright law be amenable to a more limited, but 
longer term monopoly solely on duplication through exact replication or 
derivative works? 
Synthetic biological creations have yet to be the subject of a copyright 
infringement litigation, so it would be prudent to look to an analogous area 
for input and interpretation of this copyrightable subject matter issue. The 
counterargument is found in artistic expression cases, most notably, Kelley 
v. Chicago Park District.59 
Kelley tells the tale of Chapman Kelley, an artist of landscapes (as 
opposed to a landscaper or floral designer60) who created a large pictorial 
display of living wildflowers in Grant Park in downtown Chicago, titled 
“Wildflower Works.” The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit both had a 
terrifically difficult time getting their judicial heads around the case—or at 
least it would appear so from the approach to the artistic work taken by both 
courts in the case. The opinions are two more confirmations of what Justice 
Holmes said 110 years ago: “It would be a dangerous undertaking for 
persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the 
worth of pictorial illustrations…”61 
 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313-18 (1980), and Myriad Genetics, 133 
S. Ct. at 2118-19, both held that living, breathing organisms created by a scientist could be 
the subject of a patent. 
 59. Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 60. See John Nivala, The Landscape Art of Daniel Urban Kiley, 29 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 267, 268 (2005). 
 61. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903). 
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Kelley's Plan for Wildflower Works 
http://www.rarin.org/index.php/File:KelleyChicagoAerial.JPG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The non-precedential trial court opinion found that the work was a 
painting or sculpture, and further found that it was a “work of visual art” 
under 17 U.S.C. § 101, and qualified as a “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
[work]” under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); nevertheless, the work was held not to 
be copyrightable because it was held to be not original, although it was not 
Wildflower Works Installation, http://clancco.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/CWFW1992.jpg 
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copied from any other work.62 The more relevant and detrimental opinion is 
that of the Seventh Circuit, which reversed the trial court in most respects, 
and found that the Wildflowers Works installation was original, but that it 
could not be copyrightable because of the nature of the living media, 
wildflowers, which were held to be not fixed in a tangible media, and not 
authored by Kelley.63  
Note that, although the court’s determination is persuasive authority 
against a broad recognition of the copyrightability of works made from 
preexisting living media, it is not a refutation of living media as subjects of 
copyright. It is a refutation of preexisting growing, moving, living objects 
as being copyrightable because they are not fixed in a tangible medium and 
not authored by the artist or other purported “creator” of the works other 
than God or Mother Nature. 
The authorship equation used by the Seventh Circuit is that Kelley’s 
work is made up of plants; Kelley didn’t create the plants (God did), so he 
is not the author of the plants. The plants make up the garden; Kelley is 
responsible for the garden being there, but he did not create the plants in the 
garden, so see the first answer here. On fixation, the Seventh Circuit notes 
that plants sway in the breeze, they move, they grow, they wither, they die; 
therefore, they are not fixed.64 The authors of the narratives of living 
subject matter must be cognizant of this viewpoint.  
There appear to be few cases on the issue of copyrightability of living 
subject matter—Kelley appears to be a loner, and Kelley cites no other cases 
on this point.65 My research has failed to produce other cases directly on 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., No. 04 C 07715, 2008 WL 4449886 at *5, 6 (N.D. Ill. 
Sep. 29, 2008). 
 63. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 303 (“The real impediment to copyright here is not that 
Wildflower Works fails the test for originality (understood as ‘not copied’ and ‘possessing 
some creativity’) but that a living garden lacks the kind of authorship and stable fixation 
normally required to support copyright . . . .”). 
 64. Id. at 304-05. 
 65. Analogous cases such as Cockburn v. SWS Industries, Inc., No. C10–1566RSL, 
2011 WL 2295145 (W.D. Wash. Jun. 8, 2011), Dimitrakopoulus v. Flowers by Demetrios, 
79 Civ. 6961 (RLC), 1983 WL 1135 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1983), and Florabelle Flowers, Inc. 
v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), are somewhat useful in 
predicting the analysis of living media.  The cases involved the creation of artificial flowers.  
The courts did not balk at copyright protection for these creations, they simply limited the 
copyright and the protectable elements according to the scenes a faire and merger doctrines. 
See also Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007); Satava v. 
Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 810-11 (9th Cir. 2003); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 
905, 909 (2d Cir. 1980); Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 
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point. It is noteworthy that Kelley does not preclude living media, it simply 
divides the issue into two questions: (1) are living works fixed, and (2) are 
living works authored? I will follow this path in my analysis, too. 
III. Fixation Narratives of Living Media 
Regarding fixation, the statutory standard is “fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can 
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or 
with the aid of a machine or device.”66 Section 101 elaborates on this 
requirement, stating: “A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression 
when its embodiment . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to 
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more 
than transitory duration.”67 “Author” or “authored” are not separately 
defined, but “created” is: “A work is ‘created’ when it is fixed in a copy or 
phonorecord for the first time; where a work is prepared over a period of 
time, the portion of it that has been fixed at any particular time constitutes 
the work as of that time, and where the work has been prepared in different 
versions, each version constitutes a separate work.”68  
Fixation is not dependent on media. To assure that copyright law 
remained media neutral, Congress defined fixation of works to include “any 
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which 
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either 
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”69 
The legislative history of the fixation provision states: 
This broad language is intended to avoid the artificial and largely 
unjustifiable distinctions, derived from cases such as [White-
Smith] . . . under which statutory copyrightability in certain cases 
has been made to depend upon the form or medium in which the 
                                                                                                                 
1093 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 
562 F.2d 1157, 1163 n.5 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 66. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (emphasis added). 
 67. Id. § 101 (definition of “fixed”). “Copies” are “material objects, other than 
phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and 
from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either 
directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term “copies” includes the material 
object, other than a phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed.”  Id. (definition of 
“copies”). 
 68. Id. (definition of “created”). 
 69. Id. § 102(a); Deborah Tussey, Technology Matters: The Courts, Media Neutrality, 
and New Technologies, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 427, 429 (2005). 
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work is fixed. Under the bill it makes no difference what the 
form, manner, or medium of fixation may be—whether it is in 
words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or any other graphic or 
symbolic indicia, whether embodied in a physical object in 
written, printed, photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or 
any other stable form, and whether it is capable of perception 
directly or by means of any machine or device “now known or 
later developed.”70  
This leads to the language of 17 U.S.C. § 101, quoted here more 
completely: 
A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its 
embodiment in a copy . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to 
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A 
work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being 
transmitted, is “fixed” for purposes of this title if a fixation of the 
work is being made simultaneously with its transmission . . . .71 
Fixation is supposed to be a simple, open-ended, painfully easy to satisfy 
concept. The need to perceive the creation is all that matters, and you can 
even use machines to do the perception. If the creation is oral or fleeting or 
otherwise transitory in nature, you can record it with a longer-lasting media 
such as a visual, audio, or audio-visual recording that depicts or records the 
creation. 
Wildflower works should have met each of the fixation criteria. It could 
be seen, felt, smelt, and even tasted if you wanted to try any of these 
experiences. It existed in drawings, photographs, and other depictions and 
descriptions. Its nature was known well enough to copy it or avoid copying 
it. The nature of the creation was no mystery to anyone. 
IV. Authorship and the Narrative of Creation of Works in Living Media 
A. Authorship of Works of Living Media Beyond God or Mother Nature 
The creation issue is similarly easy to resolve. With living artistic subject 
matter, there is no pressing need for a metaphor or analogy to the creation 
of copyrightable subject matter—the works are expressive works in the 
                                                                                                                 
 70. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 5665 (1976). 
 71. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
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form of pictorial or sculpture media. Pictorial and sculptural works are 
category 5 of copyrightable subject matter under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
The Kelley courts’ interpretation of authorship is that:  
 
! art installations containing living media (e.g., wildflowers) 
cannot be a painting or sculpture because they are flowers and 
plants, and the artist did not create the flowers and plants; 
! art installations containing living media cannot be a painting 
or sculpture because they move, they change, they grow, or 
they wither and die; 
! art installations are not paintings or flowers because they are a 
garden. 
 
First, the criticism that a work cannot be a painting because it consists of 
living items mistakes media for creation of expression. Every painting is 
made of something—its media. At some level of immediacy, the media is 
traceable to a natural organic or chemical substance that was formed or 
grown in or on the earth. The canvas is traced to cotton duck or linen, 
which is traced to the cotton plant, which grew out of the earth. The 
stretcher bars are made of wood which grew up as a tree. The paint medium 
might be a naturally occurring substance such as charcoal or raw umber, or 
a slightly more complicated composition of lapis lazuli and linseed oil 
making ultramarine, or a chemical composition of matter constituting 
Prussian blue or one of the many synthetic hues that have become the 
normal media in artistic production. Sculpted media is similarly situated, 
substituting only a natural or manipulated media of clay, stone, metal, or a 
casting media that is plastic (i.e., malleable, able to be molded or shaped). 
An expression using existing media is copyrightable regardless of the form 
of media used; copyright law intentionally is media-neutral.72 
Second, the fact that creations of living media might move, or change, or 
grow, or wither and die and decompose again is not indicative of the 
element of authorship or of fixation. Consider that any work using 
wildflowers or some other living, organic media could be frozen in time by 
encasing it in Lucite or actually keeping it frozen at a sufficiently low 
temperature to keep it from decaying. Does that make the expression of the 
work different—regarding as we must that it is the expression of the work 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Compare the definition of a “work of visual art” in 17 U.S.C. § 101, which was 
defined in a completely different, media-dependent manner so as to carefully delineate 
works subject to moral rights protection from works that will not be protected. 
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that causes us to think of copyright protection at all. Even absent that 
treatment, the comparison of the movability of one form of work versus 
another simply is a matter of degree: all painting surfaces are susceptible to 
expansion and contraction from humidity levels and temperature; they just 
move at so small a rate that we would hardly trouble to measure it. 
Sculptures of stone may be less moveable from temperature than metal, but 
again, the movement in each case is hardly noticeable. The movement by 
wind and air current works a great effect on wildflowers and plants in the 
great outdoors, less so indoors, but not much less than the workings of air 
currents on paper mobiles and other delicate sculptures. All materials 
degrade over time, although with some care there are media that seem 
“permanent.” All that this reflects is our comfort level with a semblance of 
permanence corresponding to our time of observation in the presence of the 
work. A highly fugitive dye placed in direct sunlight will give up its color 
faster than a wildflower. Neither is permanent, and the relative speed of 
alternation is easily observable but hardly seems remarkable when one is 
considering the potential of a work to express original creative attributes 
protectable in copyright.  
Last, the fact that some artistic installations might resemble something 
else—a garden—is not a question concerning copyrightability, it is one of 
aesthetics and philosophy. If the issue was, is this “art,” we might ponder 
for a time whether an expressive composition of living matter was 
sufficiently artistic to meet our standards when it was created by a self-
proclaimed gardener as opposed to a self-proclaimed or externally certified 
artist. We tend not to credit the work of first-time amateurs as high art, 
although on occasion the results are very intricate and beautiful. 
Nevertheless, the issue here is copyrightability, and the artistic merit of the 
work or the creator never has been a requirement for copyrightability. 
And what makes living media expressive? Color, shape, forms, 
textures—all of which are possessed by wildflowers and living media as 
well and often to a greater degree than other media, such as paint in tubes, 
blank canvas, or a mound of sculpting clay. The same attributes of color, 
shape, forms, and textures that provide the difference in the expression 
perceived from a blank white canvas compared to that of a highly detailed 
landscape are provided by a palate of wildflowers combined and arranged 
on dark earth. 
V. Originality Narriative of Creations of Living Media  
All of the above discussion of analogies and narratives leads to the first 
genuine, inescapable flaw that may affect the desirability of protecting the 
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work of synthetic biology through copyright: the work of authorship 
claimed through the triple metaphor of synthetic biology described above is 
a work that manipulates real life organic compounds and sequences of 
compounds in order to produce dynamic, replicative, perennial components 
of living organisms. This fact is exactly the point of seeking copyright 
protection in the first place—biologists want to protect their living, 
growing, multiplying works from unauthorized duplication. The true value 
to the scientist and the world is not the expressive, communicative potential 
of the work. It is the fact that it is a living thing or a component of a living 
thing that performs a role to change aspects of other living things that 
matters to the scientist. This statement represents the awesome potential of 
synthetic biology.73 But living subject matter is a troublesome subject for 
copyright’s originality requirements.74 
A. Originality and Living Media: the Story of First Creations 
The creation of original expression is the essential requirement for a 
copyrightable work.75 “The sine qua non of copyright is originality.”76 
Originality is the very “premise of copyright law.”77 
The definition of original is “not copied,”78 rather than something that is 
entirely new, fresh, novel, and excessively creative.79 “Originality does not 
signify novelty; a work may be original even though it closely resembles 
other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of 
copying.”80  
 
                                                                                                                 
 73. E.g., Torrance, Synthesizing, supra note 10, at 632-39; Torrance, DNA, supra note 
10, at 22-26; Andrew Torrance, Patenting Human Evolution, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1075, 
1084-91 (2008); Holman, supra note 10, at 701-03. 
 74. Not so for patent law. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), held that 
living, breathing organisms could be the subject of a patent. 
 75. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991); Stewart v. 
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 247–48 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Goldstein v. 
California, 412 U.S. 546, 561–62 (1973). 
 76. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
 77. Id. at 347 (quoting Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th 
Cir. 1981)). 
 78. Id. at 346-47; Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884); 
The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). 
 79. .Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (“[C]opyright 
protects originality rather than novelty or invention . . . ”). In contrast, patent protection 
requires an invention that is novel and nonobvious. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2006). 
 80. .Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
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The narrative of originality for synthetic biology is simple: the synthetic 
biologist demonstrates that the work was her own conception and 
execution, not copied. Thus, the “not copied” requirement of originality 
presumably will be easy to meet, unless a biologist has copied someone 
else’s biological creation. A biologist who creates a new work according to 
the narratives of creation and subject matter discussed above, without 
copying another’s work, will have an original work. But the scope of the 
copyright over this original creation is likely to be reduced by the idea-
expression doctrine under 17 U.S.C. § 102 and its two sub-doctrines of 
merger and scenes a faire. 
In the subject matter section, the goal was to discover the best narrative 
for the creations of synthetic biology so as to preserve the largest possible 
scope of the copyright. The problem of copyrightability discussed in 
Section II(A) supra concerns whether the sum and substance of the 
intellectual products of synthetic biology are discoveries or inventions of 
uncopyrightable ideas, processes, procedures that manipulate preexisting 
materials possessing natural, chemical characteristics, none of which was 
authored by the biologist, so as to produce functional results. This blunt 
assertion is not fatal to the claim of copyright over synthetic biological 
works, but it does point to the need to securely fix the story of original 
creation by the biologist author in a stable media so as to preserve a proper 
scope of protection over the biologist’s works. 
Although no copyright claim is known to have been litigated concerning 
synthetic biology, a prediction can be made that there are many ideas 
behind the creation that cannot be brought within the copyright. As in 
patent law, the operation of nature cannot be claimed by any human author, 
nor can the raw material used by the biologist to make the creation. To the 
extent that the creation uses a formula (process, or procedure) in the act of 
creation, this formula will not be protected by copyright. If the formula was 
the whole point of the biological activity, the copyright obtained over the 
product of the formula may be unsatisfactory. This, of course, is a 
significant difference between patent law and copyright law—the former 
protects ideas and inventions including formulas, processes, and 
procedures; the latter protects no ideas, and no formulas, processes, or 
procedures. 
Living artistic works are likely to fare better in the balance of ideas vs. 
expression. One can imagine that an artist might develop a highly inventive 
process of creation of living media, and would face similar problems under 
copyright’s idea-expression distinction as a biologist would. The inventive 
artist might one day find the need to investigate patenting an artistic 
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technique or process of creation. But in general, the development of 
innovative techniques and processes is not the creative endeavor that 
matters the most to an artist. It is the expression that makes the artist, and 
the original expressive qualities of the work are the most likely to survive 
the application of the idea-expression doctrine. 
B. The Scope of the Author’s Copyright After the Application of the Merger 
and Scenes a Faire Doctrines 
Ideas are not monopolized in copyright law. Others may learn from the 
ideas reflected in synthetic biological works, and may use that knowledge 
to pursue a myriad of original projects that do not duplicate the works of the 
first biologist. This is one of the main reasons why copyright might be a 
sufficient mode of protection for some synthetic biologists whose 
achievements are an original creation with highly expressive, non-
functional characteristics—the kind of work that copyright can protect from 
duplication and give a fair scope of protection for derivative works. On the 
other hand, some biological creations will be largely defined by the 
practical functions of the creation. These functional aspects will not be 
protected by copyright, and if the functioning appears to follow the form of 
the work, the merger doctrine will limit the scope of copyright protection 
for the original and any derivative works. Patent law may be a more 
desirable vehicle of protection than copyright for these functional works 
Discussion of originality in copyright law begins with one axiomatic 
proposition: there can be no valid copyright in facts.81 “[N]o author may 
copyright his ideas82 or the facts he narrates.”83 The key to understanding 
the merger doctrine and scenes a faire doctrine lies in understanding why 
facts are not copyrightable.  
                                                                                                                 
 81. Id. at 344. The Feist case and the originality requirements defined therein are 
discussed in Tyler T. Ochoa, 1984 and Beyond: Two Decades of Copyright Law, 20 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 167, 169-70 (2003); Daniel Gervais, Feist Goes 
Global: A Comparative Analysis of the Notion of Originality In Copyright Law, 49 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC. 949 (2002); Jane C. Ginsburg, Wendy J. Gordon, Arthur R. Miller & 
William F. Patry, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long Is Too 
Long?, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 660-63 (2000); Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? 
Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 338, 367-87 (1992). 
 82. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
 83. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 556 (1985). 
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No one may claim originality as to the reporting and publication of 
facts.84 Facts, meaning data and information about the world, do not owe 
their origin to an act of authorship.85 The first person to find and report a 
particular fact has not created the fact; he or she has merely discovered its 
existence.86 Facts are not original to an author who writes about the facts. 
All facts—scientific, historical, biographical, and news of the day—belong 
to the public domain and are available to every person.87 
Nevertheless, while others may copy the underlying facts and ideas from 
a publication, they may not copy the exact words or arrangement used to 
present them.88 For example, the facts of a president’s life are subject to 
copying and republication but not his exact words and phrases regarding 
public figures and public events written in an autobiography.89 The artist’s 
or scientist’s creative expression and embodiment of the idea is protected.90 
Copyright assures authors the right to control their original expression, but 
encourages others to borrow the underlying ideas and themes used by the 
original author and create their own original expression.91 This principle, 
known as the idea-expression dichotomy, applies to all works of 
authorship.92 
The definition of an “idea” in a literary work often is the most difficult 
aspect of the idea-expression dichotomy.93 Judge Learned Hand 
characterized the difficulty in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.94 as 
arising from the fact that an idea as opposed to the expression of the idea in 
literature can be manipulated by viewing the interest protected by copyright 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Feist, 499 U.S. at 347; 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.2.1.4 
(2005) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT]; NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 45, § 
2.11[A]. 
 85. Feist, 499 U.S. at 347; GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 83, § 2.2.1.4. 
 86. Feist, 499 U.S. at 347; GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 83, § 2.2.1.4. 
 87. Feist, 499 U.S. at 347; Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369 
(5th Cir. 1981); GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 83, § 2.2.1.4. 
 88. Feist, 499 U.S. at 348. 
 89. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556-57, 563 
(1985). 
 90. Id.; Feist, 499 U.S. at 348-49. 
 91. Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-50; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556-57. 
 92. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 350; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556-57. See generally 
GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 83, § 2.3. 
 93. See GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 83, § 2.3.1.1; NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, 
supra note 45, § 1.10[B][2]. 
 94. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). 
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at differing levels of abstraction.95 If protection is limited to the words as 
they appear on the page—a strictly literal application of the term 
“expression”—the protection for original “Writings” envisioned by the 
Constitution96 would be considerably thin.97 A new author could imitate the 
plot, character types, exposition, conflict, resolution, and all other original 
elements of a novel so long as she changed the wording.98 But if protection 
extends to the full range of derivative works that might be expressed by the 
author arising from the author’s fleshing out of an “idea” in literature, then 
an author could claim property rights to an entire genre.99 Edgar Allan Poe 
or Wilkie Collins could have captured the mystery genre with the 
publication of a single mystery story; the innovators of the first reality 
television show, Survivor, might have deprived the public of The Amazing 
Race, Fear Factor, Big Brother, or even Temptation Island.100 
The difficulty is not present in visual works or living media. There are a 
myriad of possible ways to express ideas visually;101 similarly, there are a 
myriad of possible creations of synthetic biology. A new author need only 
refrain from copying one. A perfect example of the idea-expression 
dichotomy in visual works is the case of photography. Photography takes as 
its subject the concrete objects (the facts) of the world around us, and yet 
for over a hundred and twenty years the Supreme Court has recognized that 
works of photography are sufficiently creative and original as to obtain the 
protection of copyright.102 This is true for staged and posed subjects of 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Id. at 121; see also Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(discussing Nichols). 
 96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 97. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 45, § 1.10[B][2]; see GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, 
supra note 83, § 2.3.1.2 
 98. See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121. 
 99. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 45, §§ 1.10[B][2], [C][2]; see also GOLDSTEIN 
ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 83, § 2.3.2. 
 100. Nash, 899 F.2d at 1540; Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 291 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (Roth, J. dissenting). 
 101. See Mattel, Inc. v. Goldberger Doll Mfg. Co., 365 F.3d 133, 135 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(innumerable ways of depicting doll faces); Southco, 390 F.3d at 292 (Roth, J. dissenting) 
(Southco's numbering rules and the resulting numbers are one of many possible expressions 
of the idea of using a code to convey product specifications); Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 
979 F.2d 242, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Atari II) (Ginsburg, J.), appeal after remand from 888 
F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Atari I) (Ginsburg, J.) (innumerable ways of depicting breakout 
game features). 
 102. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884); Leigh v. 
Warner Bros., 212 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2000). Yet, there are dissenting voices 
regarding the recognition of photography as a creative, original, copyrightable media. See 
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photographs as well as for advertising and for more natural or random snap-
shots.103 What the author of a photograph work brings to the creativity and 
originality equation is an artist’s sense of composition, angle, exposure, F-
stop and aperture settings, background, and lighting, and creation of certain 
elements of the scene.104 In Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co.,105 the Southern 
District of New York categorized this originality into three specific areas: 
rendition (angle, light, shade, exposure, filter effects, developing 
techniques, or composition) of the photograph, the timing of the photograph 
(how it fortuitously or consciously captures the moment when the 
expression associated with the subject matter is the most poignant), or the 
creation of the subject matter of the photograph (as when the photographer 
stages or creates original subject matter for photographing).106 However, 
nothing in these original elements prevents another author from 
photographing, painting, writing about, or otherwise using the same subject 
matter (the facts) in their own original expression as long as they do not 
copy the first author’s expression.107 
Copyright protection is subject to an important limitation: “the mere fact 
that a work is copyrighted does not mean that every element of the work 
may be protected.”108 The requirement of originality means that copyright 
protection extends only to those components of a work that are original to 
the author.109 
The merger doctrine is a variation or application of the idea-expression 
dichotomy.110 When the idea and the expression of the idea are inseparable, 
then the expression will not be copyrightable because it would necessarily 
give the author a monopoly on the expression of the underlying idea.111 In 
                                                                                                                 
generally Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright's Response to the 
Invention of Photography, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 385, 446-51 (2004). 
 103. Sarony., 111 U.S. at 60; Leigh, 212 F.3d at 1215; Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 
(9th Cir. 2003); Los Angeles News Serv.  v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 104. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250; Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1077 (9th 
Cir. 2000); Los Angeles News Serv., 973 F.2d at 794 (quoting United States v. Hamilton, 583 
F.2d 448, 452 (9th Cir. 1978)). 
 105. 377 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 106. Id. at 452-53. 
 107. See id. at 454; Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1082; Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 
F.2d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 108. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See generally Michael D. Murray, Copyright, Originality, and the End of the Scènes 
à Faire and Merger Doctrines for Visual Works, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 779, 799-848 (2006). 
 111. See Educational Testing Services v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 539 (3d Cir. 1986). 
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other words, if there is only one way to express or depict an idea then no 
one may claim a copyright in that single manner of expression or depiction 
because that would evict everyone else from the right to express or depict 
that idea.112 
The merger doctrine is traced to Learned Hand’s opinion in Nichols v. 
Universal Pictures Corp.,113 and the opinion links the principles underlying 
the merger doctrine to those underlying the scenes a faire doctrine, although 
neither doctrine is named in the opinion. The Nichols case involved two 
literary works (a stage play and a screenplay) alleged to be substantially 
similar. There was no allegation that actual scenes or actual text was copied 
from the first work into the second, but Judge Hand observed that, “It is of 
course essential to any protection of literary property, whether at common-
law or under the statute, that the right cannot be limited literally to the text, 
else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations.”114 The first work 
involved a Jewish widower whose son secretly married an Irish Catholic 
girl whose widower father was as against the union as the Jewish father 
was.115 Eventually, the two fathers reconcile in order to rejoin the company 
of their respective children and grandchildren.116 The second work involved 
a Jewish family who lived in a state of animosity with their neighbors, an 
Irish Catholic family.117 The only family members not engaged in the 
quarrel from the fathers to the mothers (who are present and accounted for) 
to young children and family pets were the daughter of the Jewish family 
and the son of the Irish family, who, as you may have guessed, secretly 
marry.118 Further conflict is introduced in that the Jewish father inherits a 
sizeable sum of money, but later learns that the proper legatee is the Irish 
father, and in turning over the money, he prompts an unlikely friendship 
and partnership between the two fathers.119  
Judge Hand noted that,  
[w]hen the plagiarist does not take out a block in suit, but an 
abstract of the whole, decision is more troublesome. Upon any 
work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of 
increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of 
                                                                                                                 
 112. See GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 83, § 2.3.2. 
 113. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.1930). 
 114. Id. at 121. 
 115. Id. at 119. 
 116. Id. at 119-20. 
 117. Id. at 120. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 121. 
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the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the 
most general statement of what the play is about, and at times 
might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of 
abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise 
the playwright could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to which, 
apart from their expression, his property is never extended. 
[citation omitted] Nobody has ever been able to fix that 
boundary, and nobody ever can.120 
The opinion declared that stealing lines or scenes or stealing specific 
characters from a work may be actionable if it is a substantial taking,121 but 
the comparison of the similarity of two plots and storylines requires 
examination of the lowest level of abstraction it takes to find the two works 
to be the same; if the works are only similar at a high level of abstraction, it 
will be less likely that their similarity will constitute actionable 
infringement. For example, the two works at issue in Nichols may be 
abstracted as follows (starting with a high level of abstraction and working 
downward):  
 
! two works about two men with children;  
! two works about two men whose children marry;  
! two works about two men whose children marry causing the 
men grief and anger; 
! two works about two men whose children marry in secret 
causing the men grief and anger;  
! two works about two men from different religions whose 
children marry in secret causing the men grief and anger 
because of their religious differences;  
! two works about two men from different religions whose 
children marry in secret causing the men grief and anger 
because of their religious differences but who reconcile in the 
end;  
! two works about a Jewish man and an Irish Catholic man 
whose children marry in secret causing them grief and anger 
because of their religious differences but who reconcile in the 
end;  
 
and so on.  
                                                                                                                 
 120. Id. 
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2014]        POST-MYRIAD GENETICS COPYRIGHT 47 
 
 
If the level of abstraction at which the works share the most similarities 
mainly involves the level of ideas (e.g., the idea of pig-headed men who 
cannot get along because of religious differences; the idea of men who 
overcome petty religious differences in favor of stronger values), or 
generalities (e.g., problems of marriages of two people from different 
religions; the situation of marriages that cause animosity in families but 
later produce a kind of coexistence), or repeats plot devices and stock 
themes common to many works (e.g., star-crossed lovers; feuding families 
brought together by a marriage of defectors; fathers who compromise 
because of love of children or grandchildren), then the works are similar at 
a level where the first author cannot claim protection. The abstraction of 
two literary works for comparison of the plot and storyline must not result 
in a pattern of similarity that has eliminated so many disparate details of the 
works that the remaining similarities are simply plot ideas, stock themes, or 
common character types interacting in predictable ways.122 This is the level 
of abstraction where Judge Hand found the two works in Nichols, and he 
rejected the claim for infringement.123 
The process of abstraction and comparison described in Nichols works 
well in literary works where individual authors, all using a common 
language (English), may discuss a common theme or plot device or 
character-type or flesh out a familiar scene or stock image. In such 
instances, all literary works will share commonalities if they share a 
common idea but not elements that are original to one author. The idea and 
the expression of the idea will merge in a literary sense as the idea itself 
captures the several words and phrases necessary to communicate the idea 
in writing. Judge Hand recognized that it is prudent to declare such plot 
ideas, character-types, familiar scenes, and stock images as part of the 
public domain, available to all authors who wish to embody the idea or 
scene in their own work.124 Thus, his decision is the grandfather of both the 
merger doctrine and the scenes a faire doctrine. 
In the last two decades, the merger doctrine has seen the most increase in 
its application in cases concerning computer programs. Thus, synthetic 
biologists should be especially mindful of merger because the source of 
greatest protection for works is likely to be through the metaphor of a 
computer program. As noted above, computer programs are both literary 
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(the source code and object code)125 and functional;126 sometimes they 
produce visual results, too. The argument was raised and accepted in many 
computer code copyright cases that within a given programming language, 
certain results (the ideas) cannot be achieved without using certain 
expression (source code).127 Thus, a merger of idea and expression was 
found and sequences of source code were declared to be uncopyrightable to 
avoid giving an early programmer a monopoly over a number of results in 
the context of the use of a certain programming language.128 
The merger doctrine is inapplicable when the same idea can be expressed 
in a plurality of different manners.129 In these situations each author’s 
creative original expression of the idea is deserving of copyright 
protection.130 
A perfect example of how courts misinterpret the merger doctrine in 
connection with visual works is the Ninth Circuit case of Herbert Rosenthal 
Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian.131 In Kalpakian, the court determined that 
there was only one way for the idea of a jeweled pin in the shape of a bee to 
effectively be depicted.132 As a result, the court ruled that defendant could 
copy plaintiff’s depiction of a jeweled bee pin because plaintiff’s depiction 
was the only possible effective depiction, and plaintiff cannot claim a 
copyright monopoly in the only available method of depicting an idea.133 
The idea and the depiction are one, and no one can copyright an idea. 
Although this is a venerated opinion, cited and accepted for decades,134 the 
opinion simply is wrong. The fallacy of the opinion is that there is only one 
effective way to depict a jeweled bee pin. Nothing limits the creative 
potential of the designer of a jeweled bee pin other than the simple notion 
                                                                                                                 
 125. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 45, § 2.04[C]; see Computer Software 
Copyright Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 101-
117) (definition of “computer program”). 
 126. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 45, § 2.18[J]. 
 127. Id. §§ 2.04[C], 2.18[B], 2.18[J]; see Mark Lemley, Convergence in the Law of 
Software Copyright, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 11, 14, 16, 31 (1995). 
 128. An outcome that should be precluded by Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103-04 
(1879). See generally NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 45, §§ 2.04[C], 2.18[B]. 
 129. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 
1983); GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 83, §§ 2.3.2- 2.3.2.1. 
 130. Id.; Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 691 (2d Cir. 1926) (when a myriad of variations 
of a scene are possible, a myriad of protectable copyrights can exist). 
 131. 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971). 
 132. Id. at 742. 
 133. Id. 
 134. E.g., GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 83, § 2.3.2 & nn. 27-30. 
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that the end product should resemble a bee.135 The amount of gold or other 
metal used and exposed in the design, the size and shape and number of the 
gems or semi-precious stones used, the color, tone, shade, clarity, and 
brilliance of the gems or stones used, whether the gems or stones will have 
few or many or no facets are simply the beginning of the creative 
opportunities available to a designer of a jeweled bee pin.136 The plaintiff 
monopolizes nothing by coming out with one possible design when there 
are so many other available designs. In the light of these creative 
opportunities, there is no need to allow the defendant to copy plaintiff’s 
single and original design. 
The scenes a faire doctrine complements the merger doctrine when it is 
applied to literary works. The scenes a faire doctrine provides that when 
discussing a certain topic, story-line, or genre, there are certain themes, 
scenes, incidents, character types, or settings which as a practical matter 
must be used to properly treat the topic.137 A literary discussion of a salmon 
run will inevitably describe how they swim for hundreds of miles, fly up 
over waterfalls, some are snatched in mid-air by hungry grizzly bears, and 
the rest strive to return to the pools where they were spawned. Motion 
pictures following the boy-meets-girl, boy-gets-girl, boy-loses-girl, boy-
gets-girl-back storyline inevitably will employ character types of 
thoughtless boys and petulant girls and contain similar scenes of 
miscommunication, anger, and reconciliation in their conflict development 
and conflict resolution. A discussion of the Three Stooges’ or Chris 
Farley’s movies will inevitably contain references to “slap-stick,” “prat 
falls,” “physical comedy,” and “self-effacing humor.” The works discussing 
these scenes and themes will use similar language even at a fairly low level 
of abstraction because the very idea that is being expressed requires authors 
                                                                                                                 
 135. If the only similarity between the two works was that they both resembled a bee, 
then the plaintiff’s claim of infringement properly failed. The similarity would have been 
limited to the shared concept or idea of the two works, and the idea itself is not 
copyrightable. If the holding of Kalpakian were limited to this proposition, the case would 
be correct. But the opinion goes much farther by declaring that plaintiff produced the only 
possible design and depiction of a jeweled bee, see 446 F.2d at 742, inviting every 
subsequent jeweler to copy plaintiff’s bee design without limitation. 
 136. The record unfortunately indicates that plaintiff’s counsel was tongue-tied when it 
came to explaining the different design opportunities available to the defendant. See id. at 
740. 
 137. E.g., Atari v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 676 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir. 
1982) (superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Scandia Down Corp. v. 
Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985),  See GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra 
note 83, § 2.3.2.2. 
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to use certain terminology and phrasing.138 An author using these terms and 
phrases is not being original and cannot impose a monopoly on the terms 
and phrases associated with the scene or theme.139 
When applied in the context of literary or utilitarian works, the scenes a 
faire doctrine means that copyright protection is denied to common 
elements of work that are essential to the presentation of the subject matter 
of the work.140 The rationale for the rule is that elements dictated by subject 
matter itself necessarily lack originality.141 Another way of looking at it is 
that stock images and themes that are covered under the scenes a faire 
doctrine are in the public domain and thus free to be used by all.142 In a true 
scenes a faire situation, the plaintiff author is as likely to have drawn her 
material from the public domain as the plagiarist is, and it is even more 
likely that the alleged plagiarist need not have copied plaintiff author’s 
work at all but instead could have drawn the material from the public 
domain. 
The scenes a faire doctrine has no proper application in the case of visual 
works of living media and a very limited application in biological works. 
To the extent that the idea of certain images or biological creations are in 
the public domain, they are free for use whether characterized as scenes a 
faire or simply themes and ideas. In the visual work context, all themes and 
ideas, mundane ideas and clever ideas, stock images and innovative images, 
scenes that must be done and those that are more optional, all are proper 
subjects for works as long as the author does not copy the expression of 
another copyrighted visual work. In other words, there is no single visual 
expression of stock theme or commonplace idea that must be copied in 
order for the “scene” to be “done” properly. That is why many courts have 
                                                                                                                 
 138. See GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 83, § 2.3.2.2. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs, Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 214-
15 (3d Cir. 2002); Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1375 (10th Cir. 1997). See 
generally Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright: The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, 41 FLA. L. REV. 79, 90-
96 (1989); GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 83, § 2.3.2.2.   
 141. Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs, Inc., 307 F.3d at 214-15; Mitel, Inc., 124 F.3d at 
1375. 
 142. See, e.g., Incredible Techns, Inc. v. Virtual Techns, Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 1011-12 
(7th Cir. 2005); Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 850 (9th Cir. 2004); Murray Hill Publ’ns, 
Inc. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 361 F.3d 312, 319 (6th Cir. 2004); Tufenkian 
Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2003); 
Computer Mgt. Assistance Co. v. Robert F. DeCastro, Inc., 220 F.3d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 
2000). 
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recognized that scenes a faire is a doctrine that applies to literary or 
dramatic works.143 It does not fit with visual works.  
Synthetic biological works are similar. A copyrighted synthetic organic 
creation does not preclude another biologist from working to recreate the 
idea and function of the creation; but recreation does not mean copying. 
Neither merger nor scenes a faire require the stripping of every expressive 
aspect of a biological creation because the end product also has a function. 
Computer programs are the perfect analogy here: certain elements of 
display and function are stripped because there is only one way to achieve 
the result using the existing (non-proprietary) computer language.144 But the 
program as a whole survives and is protected. 
The idea of a soup can as the subject of a painting is in the public 
domain, but Andy Warhol’s embodiment of that idea in the form of a 
Warhol painting of a Campbell’s soup can is not in the public domain.145 
No artist wishing to embody the idea of a soup can in their work needs to 
copy Warhol’s embodiment of that idea. They are free to paint all the soup 
cans they want (in a copyright sense, without regard to the limitations of 
other areas of the law, such as trademark and unfair competition and false 
designation of origin laws) as long as they do not copy Warhol’s 
embodiment of the idea. Jeff Koons can paint or sculpt a work embodying 
the idea of two people holding a string of puppies in their lap; he just 
cannot copy Art Rogers’s embodiment of that idea in the form of an Art 
Rogers photograph.146 
Real world, living breathing subjects are only difficult because we have 
limited (or no) experience with creations such as these. Aside from 
computer programs, the closest analogy might be the treatment of 
photography. Photography makes expressions out of real world, living, 
breathing subjects. The difficulties in applying the idea-expression 
dichotomy in photography in light of the lurking presence of the merger and 
scenes a faire doctrines is revealed by comparing two cases from the federal 
trial court of the Southern District of New York, Mannion v. Coors Brewing 
                                                                                                                 
 143. Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 287 (3d Cir. 2004) (Becker, J. 
concurring); Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 535 
(6th Cir. 2004); Murray Hill Publications, 361 F.3d at 319-20; Cavalier v. Random House, 
Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 823 (9th Cir. 2002); Country Kids 'N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 
1280, 1286 & n.7 (10th Cir. 1996); see GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 83, § 2.3.2.2. 
 144. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994).  
 145. Assuming no lapse in the registration, renewal, and protection for works created 
prior to 1977, the copyright should last at least until seventy years after Warhol’s death. 
 146. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992). 
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Co.147 and Kaplan v. Stock Market Photo Agency.148 In Mannion, the court 
considered a photograph of basketball star Kevin Garnett who was depicted 
wearing a considerable assortment of men’s jewelry.149 A similar 
photograph appeared as part of a Coor’s billboard advertisement; the 
allegedly plagiarized photograph zeroed in on the hands and mid-section of 
the model.150 Similarities were noted in the heavily veined hands of the 
model in both photographs, the same white athletic attire, and the same 
number and type and assortment and placement of the items of jewelry 
worn by the model, although the composition of the allegedly infringing 
work is a mirror image of the original.151 Coors and its ad agency defended 
the allegations by asserting that plaintiff’s photograph was not protectable: 
it was a rendition of an unprotectable idea—a heavily bejeweled African-
American man—and any alleged similarities between the two works were 
attributable to the fact that both photographers had chosen to depict the 
same subject matter. Subject matter from the real world are facts, and the 
idea of depicting such subject matter in a photograph is an idea, and ideas 
and facts are not copyrightable.  
The Mannion court rejected these assertions in their entirety. The court 
noted that photographs are readily copyrightable, and the creative, original 
elements are found in the photographer’s rendition of the photograph, the 
timing of the photograph, or the creation of the subject matter of the 
photograph.152 The court noted the originality of plaintiff’s creation and the 
rendition of the subject matter and the substantial similarity between 
defendants’ depiction and plaintiff’s,153 and denied defendants’ summary 
judgment motion. 
In this way, a biologist is not creating a completely utilitarian work but a 
rendition of the idea of a work with utilitarian functionality. The creation is 
a work of the mind, satisfying the creativity aspect of copyright, and 
original, because it is not copied. The idea of the function and utility 
                                                                                                                 
 147. 377 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 148. 133 F. Supp. 2d 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 149. The court referred to it as “bling bling.”  377 F. Supp. 2d at 447. 
 150. Id. at 448. 
 151. See id. and Images 1 and 2 attached to the opinion. 
 152. Id. at 452-53. 
 153. Id. at 456 (“The ‘idea’ (if one wants to call it that) [of the photograph] postulated by 
the defendants does not even come close to accounting for all the similarities between the 
two works, which extend at least to angle, pose, background, composition, and lighting. It is 
possible to imagine any number of depictions of a black man wearing a white T-shirt and 
‘bling bling’ that look nothing like either of the photographs at issue here.”). 
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remains open for the next biologist to pursue and create a rendition of her 
own. 
In Kaplan, the court declared that the second of two photographs 
depicting a person in businessman’s attire staring down at their feet 
dangling over the edge of a tall building as if contemplating a leap from the 
edge (i.e., a photograph of a potential executive jumper taken from the 
jumper’s perspective) could not be held to infringe the first because the 
general similarity between the two works was attributed to the two 
photographers’ choices to depict the same subject matter, and any direct 
similarities between the actual photographs was necessitated by the 
common scene and subject matter of the photographs.154 If that were the 
extent of the discussion, the case would gel nicely with Mannion; but the 
court goes on to state that “it would be impossible to depict the 
photograph’s subject matter without portraying [the subject] in [the] pose” 
selected by the original photographer.155 Then, the court incongruously 
identifies several aspects of the two photographers’ rendition or staging of 
the photograph that were freely open to artistic creativity: the point of view 
of the photograph (bird’s eye, over the shoulder, frontal, below from a far 
angle, below from a direct upward angle, or from the jumper’s point of 
view), the cropping of the photograph (close up, medium, wide angle), the 
angle of the jumper’s perspective (e.g., whether it took in a snippet of pin-
striped pants legs or a knee to shoe length of pin-striped pants legs), the 
shading of the street below in the one photograph and the inclusion of a 
second building closely abutting the opposite side of the street in the other 
photograph.156 With respect to the point of view, the court even admits: 
“There may be, as [plaintiff] Kaplan suggests, many other angles from 
which to depict this scene . . .”157 Nevertheless, the court believed that each 
artistic decision of the original photographer was dictated by the merger of 
the subject matter with the depiction and any specific elements of the 
depiction not merged with the idea of the subject matter were scenes a faire 
of the scene depicted.158 
Kaplan is a cautionary tale for synthetic biologists. It may be that a 
challenger will assert that the biological functioning of a synthetic organic 
creation can only be achieved in the exact form and expression as that of 
the first biologist. Thus, others must be permitted to copy that form and 
                                                                                                                 
 154. See 133 F. Supp. 2d at 323-28. 
 155. Id. at 324. 
 156. Id. at 325-26. 
 157. Id. at 326. 
 158. Id. at 323-25 & n.10. 
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expression or the first biologist will have a monopoly on a useful, 
functional idea achieved not in patent law but in copyright law. 17 U.S.C. § 
102 precludes this monopoly. 
The difference between Kaplan and Mannion is that the Mannion court 
correctly rejects the application of the merger and scenes a faire doctrines to 
visual works because it held that the idea-expression distinction should be 
severely limited in cases involving visual works. Mannion discussed the 
abstraction analysis of Nichols and the concept of the “line” that must be 
drawn where the second work takes too much protected original expression 
because it encompasses too specific an abstraction of the first work.159 
Mannion stated that with respect to visual media, such as photography: 
the line itself is meaningless because the conceptual categories it 
purports to delineate are ill-suited to the subject matter. . . . The 
idea/expression distinction arose in the context of literary 
copyright. For the most part, the Supreme Court has not applied 
it outside that context. . . . In the visual arts, the distinction 
breaks down. . . . [O]ne cannot divide a visual work into neat 
layers of abstraction in precisely the same manner one could 
with a text. . . . [L]ittle is gained by attempting to distinguish an 
unprotectible “idea” from its protectible “expression” in a 
photograph or other work of visual art. . . . The idea/expression 
distinction in photography, and probably the other visual arts, 
thus achieves nothing . . . [and] is not useful or relevant.160 
The Mannion opinion preserves the creative original components of 
photography and original combinations of unprotectable components that 
are meant to be protected under the holdings of Feist and Sarony. It 
accomplishes this by limiting the application of the idea-expression 
distinction in cases involving visual works and rejecting the expansive 
application of the merger and scenes a faire doctrines to visual works. 
C. Effects of the Expanding Application of the Merger and Scenes a faire 
Doctrines on Living Works 
The courts have not been content to limit the application of the merger 
doctrine and the scenes a faire doctrine to literary or dramatic settings. 
Instead, courts have applied these doctrines to claims of infringement of 
visual works wherein the elements of visual works that are claimed to be 
                                                                                                                 
 159. Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 160. Id. at 458, 459, 461 (inner citations and reference to inner quotations omitted). 
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unprotected under the merger doctrine or scenes a faire doctrine are filtered 
out and purposefully ignored when comparing a competing work against 
the original in a test of substantial similarity.161 The results in far too many 
cases is that visual works are reduced down to nothing which further results 
in the award of summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law for the 
defendant before the finder of fact even gets a chance to make an intrinsic 
evaluation of the substantial similarity of the two works. With living visual 
media, there are opposing cases that do not strip away the works, and the 
artist should exploit this body of cases to the fullest.162This points to two 
recommendations for synthetic biology: make multiple records, 
descriptions, and depictions of the biological creation so as to multiple the 
elements that might be protected under copyright 
A biologist or her lawyer may argue that it is enough if the printout of 
the sequence she identified or created is protected, then she can enjoy the 
further protection from other biologists who might use “her” sequence for 
their own ends through the operation of the copyright derivative use rights. 
This is true, but comes with certain limitations. 
One, if the sequence merely is identified, in what way is a copyright over 
the description of the sequence to prevent others from “finding” the same 
sequence in the world, or further to prevent others from replicating the 
sequence or using it for their own ends. The first person to identify a 
species and write up a careful, scientific description of the species, does not 
obtain the right to prevent others from breeding the species, working with 
the species, or even from writing about the species. Similarly, the first 
person who discovered the properties of natural substances, such as 
petroleum or natural gas, and wrote up a careful description of these 
properties, did not obtain the right to prevent others from working with the 
natural substances, or even to write about the substances. All that is 
protected is the actual word-for-word terms used by the first author. Not 
even the ideas represented by those terms are subject to protection. 
Two, if the sequences are created, the issue is a bit more friendly to the 
concept of copyrightability, but the issue remains whether a dynamic, 
                                                                                                                 
 161. The most common formulation of the test is called the abstraction-filtration-
comparison test, which is traced to Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 
982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying the abstraction-filtration-comparison test in the 
evaluation of similarity of merged and scenes a faire elements of computer programs). 
 162. E.g., Mattel v. Goldberger Doll, Bannion, etc.  See generally Michael D. Murray, 
Copyright, Originality, and the End of the Scènes à Faire and Merger Doctrines for Visual 
Works, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 779, 799-848 (2006). 
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replicative, and perennial component of living organisms163 may be subject 
to a copyright monopoly. The issue may be cast as, is the biologist truly the 
author of this life, not God or Mother Nature? Hopefully, this is answered 
by the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the patent-eligibility of living, 
organic creations coupled with the analogy that biological works are like 
computer programs with expressive, albeit functional characteristics. 
VI. Conclusion 
The answer is that copyright can protect a great many aspects of 
synthetic biological creations. The subject matter issue is best addressed by 
application of the metaphor that synthetic biological creations are like 
computer programs. This also provides a recognizable framework for the 
analysis and large body of precedent that will allow the creations to 
withstand the merger and scenes a faire doctrines that competitors will 
attempt to use to strip away non-copyrightable elements of the creations. 
Fixation and authorship seem easier to resolve: the concepts in copyright 
law are not meant to impose heavy burdens on authors. Fixation has one 
practical requirement: can you observe the creation sufficiently with the 
senses or through some mechanical means so that you know what it is and 
can avoid copying it. It is incongruous to suppose that it means works 
cannot occasionally be in motion, or grow and develop, or age, wither, and 
change their expression over time. Virtually all works made with organic or 
naturally occurring materials would be banned from copyright if this logic 
were correct. The same can be said of authorship. No one copyrights natural 
forces. Aspects of a work that are attributable to natural forces cannot be 
claimed within the copyright of artists or scientists because they are not 
created by them. Many of the changes observed or predicted in works are 
not part of the copyright of the original artist because they were not created 
by the artist. The decaying of paint or the decaying of the life of an organic 
creation is not claimed under copyright unless the artist brings it about 
through a conception and application of a work of the mind. But the 
expressive, communicative aspects of the work may be protected in all of 
the forms created and recorded by the artist or scientist. In the end, this may 
be an acceptable formula for the protection of scientific and artistic works 
of living media. 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 163. My thanks are given once again to Osman Mirza, my consultant on synthetic 
biology, for supplying the proper descriptors here. 
